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NOTES AND COMMENTS

munity which sets the standard should be the community where
the harm will be manifested. Such considerations are the foundation of the rule that problems of tort law should be governed by the
law of the place of the wrong. These same considerations should
also determine the scope of the rule's application.
Therefore, in determining whether the rule should apply to such
a problem as that of allowing a law suit between members of a
family, it should be asked whether this is primarily a problem of
shifting loss or one of regulating the relations between the members
of a family. Since the two reasons most often advanced for the
common law rule of family immunity are the ancient concept the
husband and wife constitute in law but one person, and that to
permit such suits will create family discord and disrupt family
harmony,"8 it would appear that for problems of this kind the most
appropriate law is that of the family domicile. 9
In light of these considerations this writer suggests that North
Carolina amend G.S. § 5Z-10.1 to provide that a husband and wife
domiciled in North Carolina have a cause of action against each other
to recover for injuries, wherever sustained, as if they were unmarried.
SAMUEL S. WOODLEY, JR.

Constitutional Law-Case or Controversy-Dismissal for Mootness
Where a decision in a case at bar will have no effect because of
some intervening fact which has rendered the case moot, the United
" Ford, supra note 7, at 398, sets out the historical background and reasons for disallowing suits between spouses.
Johnson v. People's First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d
716 (1958), held that the doctrine of intrafamily immunity from suit by a
member of the family expires upon the death of the person protected and does
not extend to a decedent's estate for the reason that death terminates the
family relationship and there is no longer a relationship in which the state
or public policy has an interest.
10 The court in the principal case also dismissed plaintiff's
plea for recovery under North Carolina's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act
of 1957 by pointing out that liability insurance protects against claims
legally asserted, but does not itself produce liability. Plaintiff, however, did
not contend that the presence of liability insurance should create liability,
but rather contended with some merit that by allowing defendant immunity,
the public policy of the state, as expressed by the vehicle responsibility act,
for protecting its citizens who are injured in automobile accidents would be
contravened. In North Carolina a wife who is injured by her husband's
negligent operation of an automobile will have the protection of the insurance
required under this act, but by denying plaintiff the same protection, because
she happened to incur her injury across the state line, the insurance company
is given a fortuitous windfall.
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States Supreme Court will order the case dismissed.' That the
Court will summarily dismiss a mooted case has long been one of
the basic principles in its disposition of cases. But the question of
whether or not a case is moot is not so easily disposed of. Where
a decision by the Court would affect the parties, the Court will
decide the case on its merits.2 Even where one issue of the case has
become moot, the Court will decide the case if there are other issues
involved which remain alive.3
The events which can occur to render a case moot are legion.
A case will be dismissed as moot if the relief sought has already
been granted,4 as where the parties have settled pending appeal," or
defendant has paid plaintiff the amount contested ;6 if a statute has
been passed which renders the action unnecessary; 7 if one seeking
admission to a school has passed school age;' if, in an election dispute, those elected have already been seated by Congress;" or if the
act sought to be enjoined has already been completed by the time
the Court hears the case.' 0 The latter result is unaffected by the
1Brownlow
v. Schwartz, 261 U.S. 216 (1923); Security Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Prewitt, 200 U.S. 446 (1906); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895);
United States v. Phillips, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 776 (1832).
2 In Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946), petitioner had contested being drafted. The circuit court ordered him released
from service. On appeal to the Supreme Court he contended the case was
moot. The Court held that it was not moot because a reversal would necessitate3his re-induction into the Army.
In Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563 (1914), petitioner reached the
Supreme Court only by asserting that the White Slave Act was unconstitutional. By the time the Court heard this case, the constitutional issue had
been settled by another case. Held, that having taken jurisdiction on the
constitutional point, the Court would retain jurisdiction to decide the rest
of the case, though the constitutional question was moot. Accord, Michigan
Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913).
' Taylor v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 709 (1959) (petitioner had been re-instated
in his job); Gray v. Board of Trustees, 342 U.S. 517 (1952) (Negro petitioners had been admitted to previously segregated school).
'Buck's Stove & Range Co. v. AFL, 219 U.S. 581 (1911); Gardner v.

Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 131 U.S. ciii App. (1873).
' California v. San Pablo & T.R.R., 149 U.S. 308 (1893); Singer Mfg.
Co. v. Wright, 141 U.S. 696 (1891); San Mateo County v. Southern Pac.
R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
"United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920).
8
Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952); Atherton Mills v.
Johnston, 259 U.S. 13 (1922).
9 Richardson v. McChesney, 218 U.S. 487 (1910); Jones v. Montague, 194
U.S. 147 (1904).
517 (1952); Security Mut. Life
10 Gray v. Board of Trustees, 342 U.S.
Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 200 U.S. 446 (1906) (disputed permit to do business had
expired); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895) (disputed delegates to constitutional convention had been seated).
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fact that a damage remedy is still available.' The Court twice dismissed cases where alleged anti-trust violations had been halted
12
because of World War I.

In an unusual context, the Supreme Court has substantially
changed the law on mootness. In Robinson v. California3 the Court
reversed defendant's conviction and held that a California statute
making the status of dope addiction a crime was unconstitutional.
Afterward, the state of California filed an alternate petition for
rehearing and for an abatement of the judgment on the ground that
defendant had died before the Court decided the case. In a memorandum decision the Court denied the petition for rehearing. 1 4 Jus-

tice Clark, with whom Justices Harlan and Stewart joined, wrote a
dissenting opinion. Justice Clark called the decision of the Court
a "meaningless gesture utterly useless in the disposition of the casethe appellant being dead-and, as I read our cases, is contrary to
the general policy this Court has always followed . .

.

"

For over a century, the Court has consistently held that the
death of an appealing defendant renders the case moot. In fact, the
usual statement has been that upon the happening of defendant's
death, the case is treated as having abated altogether."0 Every circuit court ruling on the matter has held that the action is void ab
initio, and that a fine levied on the defendant in the trial court cannot now be recovered from his personal representative.' 7 From this
'xLocal

8-6, AFL-CIO v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363 (1960).
" United States v. American-Asiatic S.S. Co., 242 U.S. 537 (1917);
United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrtactien Gesellschaft, 239
U.S. 466 (1916). These cases involved alleged anti-trust violations between
American, British, and German steamship companies. The companies had
of necessity ceased doing business together because of World War I, and
the Court held that this rendered the case moot. Uriited States v. W.T. Grant
Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953) is distinguishable. There the Court held that the
case was not moot simply because defendant had filed an affidavit stating that
he would resign his positions which had brought about Clayton Act interlocking directorate prosecution. The Court stated that defendant would still be
free to resume his former practices if a decision were not reached.
12370 U.S. 660 (1962). See Note, 41 N.C.L. Rav. 244 (1963).
a'Robinson v. California, 371 U.S. 905 (1962).
5Id.at 905.
"Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338 (1945); Menken v. Atlanta,
131 U.S. 405 (1889); United States v. Daniel, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 11 (1848).
'17 Daniel v. United States, 268 F.2d 849
(5th Cir. 1959); Howard v.
Wilbur, 166 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. Mook, 125 F.2d 706
(2d Cir. 1942) ; Baldwin v. United States, 72 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1934) ; Rossi
v. United States, 21 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1927) ; Pino v. United States, 278 Fed.
479 (7th Cir. 1921) ; United States v. Theurer, 213 Fed. 964 (5th Cir. 1914) ;
Dyar v. United States, 186 Fed. 614 (5th Cir. 1911) ; United States v. Dunne,
173 Fed. 254 (9th Cir. 1909).
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it necessarily appears that Robinson must stand for a drastic change
in the Court's policy on mootness cases, despite the relatively narrow
context of the denial of a petition for rehearing.
The dissenters in Robinson, in citing Stewart v. Southern Ry., 18
outlined the procedure usually followed by the Court in such cases.
There, the Court had already decided the case on appeal, not knowing that the parties had previously settled. On petition for rehearing
this fact was pointed out to the Court, and as a result the Court
granted the petition, vacated the former judgment and remanded
to the district court with directions to dismiss the suit as moot. 0
A line of decisions separate from the Robinson case may indicate
a trend toward finding cases not moot. In these cases the defendant
had been released from prison pending the appeal; hence, they are
distinguishable from the principal case in which defendant had died
pending the appeal. In the first two cases in this series the Court
merely dismissed the appeal as moot. 20

Then, in Lewis v. United

States,2'

there was a suggestion that if the defendant could have
been tried again for the offense (it was nol prossed below), the case
might not have been moot. Next came the landmark case of St.
Pierre v. United States.22 This case differed little from the earlier
cases in its actual holding-a dismissal of the case as moot-but
was important for the incidental hint it contained which was adopted
by the Court in later decisions. The Court stated: "Nor has petitioner shown that under either state or federal law further penalties
or disabilities can be imposed on him as a result of the judgment
which has now been satisfied. 23 Finally, in Fiswick v. United
States,2 4 the budding theory blossomed as the Court unanimously
held the case not moot although the defendant had already been
released from prison. The Court pointed out that the defendant was
an alien and was liable to be deported for conviction of this crime,
that a conviction might harm any naturalization plans the defendant
had, and that he might also suffer the loss of certain civil rights. On
18315 U.S. 784 (1942).
See Little v. Bowers, 134 U.S. 547 (1890). In Cahill v.New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 351 U.S. 183 (1956), the Court had already decided the
case and had denied a petition for rehearing, but on defendant's motion to
recall, the case was re-opened in the interest of fairness.
2 Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378 (1900) ; United States v. Phillips, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 776 (1832).
- 216 U.S. 611 (1910).
22 319 U.S. 41 (1943).
23
Id.at 43.
2,4329 U.S. 211 (1946).
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these grounds the case was distinguished from St. Pierre. Thus the
doctrine of "collateral consequences," first mentioned in St. Pierre,
was actually applied in Fiswick.
In United States v. Morgani5 the doctrine's growth continued,
the Court holding in a five to four decision that the case was not moot
although defendant had been released from prison, since he had
already been convicted of another crime in a state court and was
subject to a longer sentence as a second offender. In Pollard v.
United States2 6 the doctrine reached its fullest development. The
Court, although divided five to four on the merits, was unanimous
in holding that the case was not moot. The Court said: "We think
that petitioner's reference to the above cases (Morgan and Fiswick)
sufficiently satisfies the requirement that review in this Court will
be allowed only when its judgment will have some material effect.
The possibility of consequences collateral to the imposition of sentence is sufficiently substantial to justify our dealing with the
merits."2 7 It is significant to note that there were no unusual consequences in this case, such as possible deportation or second offender
conviction, as were present in prior cases. Here the Court was
talking only about the normal consequences of conviction of a
felony-moral stigma, loss of certain civil rights, etc.
The onrush of the doctrine of collateral consequences came to
an abrupt halt in Parker v. Ellis.2 s The majority in a per curiam
decision held that since the petitioner had been released pending a
hearing in the Court on his habeas corpus writ, and since the writ
could not issue if there were no detention, the case was moot. The
majority said that Pollard was poorly considered and probably
overruled by Heflin v. United States.29 The Chief Justice, joined
by Justices Douglas, Black and Brennan, dissented. The dissenters
argued that Pollard should control this case and that the Court had
never overruled Pollard either directly or by implication. Both the
Chief Justice and Justice Douglas, in a separate dissenting opinion,
and said that the
pointed out the collateral consequences involved
30
harm done defendant below should be undone.
2-346 U.S. 502 (1954).
2'e 352
7

U.S. 354 (1957).
Id. at 358.

362 U.S. 574 (1960).

.- 358 U.S. 415 (1959). The Court did not cite Pollard.
20 Chief Justice Warren stated: "Conviction of a felony imposes a status
upon a person which not only makes him vulnerable to future sanctions
through new civil disability statutes, but which also seriously affects his

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

Just how much effect the Parker case will have on the collateral
consequences doctrine is highly debatable, for it is at least inferable
that Robinson represents a swing back in the other direction.
Whether Robinson represents such a swing or not, there can be
little doubt that the companion case of Wetzel v. Ohio8 l does so
indicate. In that case the defendant died pending the appeal and
his wife as administratrix filed a motion to be substituted as a party.
The state filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. In a per curiam decision, the Court granted the wife's motion. It also granted the state's
motion to dismiss the appeal for want of a substantial federal question. The case is significant in that the Court, by allowing the wife's
motion, necessarily decided that the case was not moot, and reached
a determination on the merits.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Wetzel, which sheds the
only light upon the reasoning of the majority, was based mainly upon
the collateral consequences involved in the case. In Ohio the costs
in a criminal case are charged personally to the defendant and his
property may be sold in enforcement of this."2 The Ohio Court of
Appeals has held that the death of a defendant did not abate the
cause, but merely left the judgment as it stood before the appeal."8
However, in the same case that court said that it did not decide the
question of whether defendant's estate was liable for the payment of
costs. But Justice Douglas said that Ohio law is apparently to the
effect that costs can be collected from a deceased's estate. Justice
Douglas cited and relied on Pollard, the key case in the "collateral
consequences" line of decisions. He specifically refused to pass
upon whether decedent's family's interest in his good name satisfied
the case or controversy requirement, but his mentioning it at all may
indicate a possible future trend. 34
Justice Clark, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, dissented
on the ground that the Court had on numerous times held that the
existence of a judgment taxing costs in such cases cannot alone
reputation and economic opportunities .... [T]here is an important public
interest involved in declaring the invalidity of a conviction obtained in vio-

lation of the Constitution. . . ." Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593-4 (1960).
U.S. 62 (1962).
8'371
3
Onio REV. CODE §§ 2949.14, .15 (1954).

State v.Sholiton, 128 N.E.2d 666 (Ct. App.Ohio 1954).
"' In United States v.Mook,125 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1942), the court stated
8

ina per curiam decision: "Nevertheless, we think itmay not be amiss to
say that itseems to us that the next-of-kin of a convicted person who dies
pending an appeal have an interest inclearing his good name, which Congress might well believe would justify a change inthe law."
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prevent dismissal. There is indeed a long line of cases supporting
the proposition that no appeal lies from a mere decree respecting
costs.

35

It seems clear that the Robinson and Wetzel cases establish some
new rules in the field of mootness. Whether or not they will be
followed is of course not known. But it appears that the Court has
applied the collateral consequences line of cases, previously limited
to situations where the defendant had been released from prison,
to cases where the defendant has died. It also appears that the doctrine, which was under attack in Parker, has been revived, and that
Pollard still stands. It is not here intended to argue whether the
Court is right or wrong in these decisions, but it is hoped that the
Court in future cases will make clear to the public and to the bar
what its position is on this matter, preferably with a full decision
squarely discussing the problem.
LAWRENCE T.

HAMMOND, JR.

Constitutional Law-Financial Responsibility Act-Liability of Insurer Without Notice
In Lane v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co.' the North Carolina Supreme
Court recently affirmed a trial court decision imposing liability on
a defendant who had absolutely no notice or opportunity to be heard
before his liability became irrevocably fixed.
The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident as a result
of the negligence of an "assigned risk" whom the defendant insured.'
The insured did not stop at the scene of the accident and did not
file an accident report3 Consequently, neither the plaintiff nor the
"Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U.S. 359 (1921); Wingert v. First Natl
Bank, 223 U.S. 670 (1912); Paper-Bag Cases, 105 U.S. 766 (1882); Elastic
Fabrics Co. v. Smith, 100 U.S. 110 (1879); Canter v. American Ins. Co., 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 307 (1830). But where the authority of the court below to
assess the costs which it levied is challenged, the case is not moot even
though the costs are all that remain to be settled. Newton v. Consolidated
Gas Co., 265 U.S. 78 (1924) ; Citizens' Bank v. Cannon, 164 U.S. 319 (1896).
-258 N.C. 318, 128 S.E.2d 398 (1962).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.34 (Supp. 1961), provides that the Commissioner of Insurance shall equitably apportion among insurance carriers "those
applicants for motor vehicle policies who are required to file proof of financial
responsibility.. . but who are unable to secure such insurance through ordinary methods."
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-166, to -182 (Supp. 1961) provide that a wilful
failure to stop is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years and/or a
fine of $500. Failure to file an accident report as required by N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-166.1 (Supp. 1961) is a misdemeanor.

